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1. Introduction 
 
This paper engages in a comparative analysis of networks amongst social and political actors 
within two specific issue-fields of British politics, namely, asylum and unemployment. In so 
doing, the paper aims to develop a series of arguments which draw on and cut across several 
sociological paths of inquiry on collective action, social movements, networks, civil society, 
and policy process. My analysis will start with the discussion of the relationship between 
social actors (movements, non-governmental organisations and voluntary groups) that make 
demands for other constituencies rather than themselves on the one hand, and policy-makers, 
political parties, and civil society groups and organisations on the other hand. This debate has 
so far relied on relatively few empirical accounts that are informed by original comparative 
data [Statham, 2001], and has received limited attention by scholars of social movements and 
collective action, who have focused in general on instances of collective action where the 
beneficiary of the political goal does not differ from the constituency group that mobilises 
[Giugni and Passy, 2001; Passy, 1998]. Indeed, this specific ‘altruistic’ relationship between 
beneficiary and constituency groups within the two selected issue-fields of asylum and 
unemployment provides one of the main conceptual and methodological foundations for their 
comparison.  
This paper applies a relational approach, focusing on the web of ties forged by pro-
asylum and pro-unemployed actors through their networks amongst themselves and with civil 
society allies in the public domain, as well as with state actors in the policy domain. The next 
section emphasises the potentialities of the relational approach in tackling a large volume of 
different research questions. In this introduction, however, I have to state immediately and 
distinctly my main investigative direction when engaging in the examination of social 
networks. This paper aims to investigate and compare the nature of ties and exchanges within 
the two political fields of asylum and unemployment in Britain, focusing on what these 
networks mean and how they work.  While it also appraises the nature of activism promoted 
in different network patterns, this paper does not aim to test the causal relationship between 
social networks and pro-asylum/pro-unemployed collective action. Indeed, it is important to 
emphasise that 1) empirical data on social networks have been collected for social actors that 
have been selected due to their very active presence in the fields of asylum and 
unemployment, and 2) this type of data is not suitable for measuring the intensity of activism, 
but rather, can capture nature, forms and direction of actors’ activism.  
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The analysis and comparison of networks across the two political issue-fields is 
delivered along two main dimensions of investigation, namely, horizontal and vertical. The 
first dimension consists of horizontal ties linking pro-asylum/pro-unemployed actors amongst 
themselves and to other civil society organisations in the public domain. Is horizontal network 
density similar across the two fields of asylum and unemployment? What is the precise nature 
of horizontal ties in each of the two fields and how are differently sustained? Are these ties 
based on identity, regular exchange of information, short-lived issue coalition, or are they 
merely limited to loose contacts based on the simple cohabitation within the same issue-field? 
The vertical dimension consists of networks linking pro-asylum/pro-unemployed actors with 
policy-makers and institutional actors. What is the precise nature of these vertical ties in each 
of the two fields and how are differently sustained? In this case, it is also crucial to focus on 
the correlation between patterns of networks at the horizontal level and at the vertical level. 
Are the different density and nature of horizontal networks in the public domain related to 
different patterns of vertical ties with institutional actors in the policy domain? 
In addition, the relationship between different patterns of social networks and 
available embedded resources will be considered in each of the two selected issue-fields. 
Since social networks provide opportunities and constraints for actors, it is crucial to 
investigate how these actors become differentially accessible to structurally embedded 
resources through different patterns of ties and exchanges, and in particular, the conditions 
under which vertical networks are preferred to horizontal networks and vice-versa. A further 
direction of analysis will thus aim to assess the extent to which the decision to build different 
network patterns is dependent upon the available resources which are accessible through 
different ties in different fields. The logical development of this argument will indeed have a 
key role in the progression of my paper, which, from then on, enters a second stage, where the 
two different network patterns built by pro-asylum and pro-unemployed organisations 
respectively, are taken as a dependent variable and explained by drawing on main theories of 
social movements and collective action. The bottom-up descriptive network analysis of the 
first part of the paper will thus be matched by the top-down consideration of explanatory 
frameworks accounting for actors’ decision to shape differently their web of ties in each of the 
two issue-fields. In particular, the paper will make use of theories focusing on the structure of 
‘political opportunities’ [Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1989] suggesting that 
contextual cross-issue-field differences are crucial determinants of cross-issue-field 
differences between networks forged by pro-asylum and pro-unemployed actors with other 
organisations across the public and policy domains. At the same time, the paper will focus on 
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the relationship between actors’ own action and their perception of working in an open or 
closed environment when interacting with each other.  
As regards the method, the research is based on analysis which is both qualitative and 
quantitative. 80 in-depth semi-structured interviews have been conducted with a) core policy-
makers (5 interviews in each issue-field: 3 at the national level and 2 at the local level), b) 
political party representatives (6 interviews in each issue-field: 3 at the national level and 3 at 
the local level), and c) civil society organisations, pro-beneficiary groups and movements (32 
interviews in each issue-field: 25 at the national level and 7 at the local level).1 The interview 
schedule for each category of actors has specifically been designed to analyse where they 
locate themselves in relations to other actors in the field. These interviews include not only 
qualitative in-depth questions (examining, for example, the framing of their political claims) 
but also sets of standardised questions, which aim to investigate action repertoires, 
mobilisation and communication strategies, institutions on which demands are made, as well 
as relationships of disagreement and co-operation with other actors in the field. In particular, 
the analysis of inter-organisational networks has been based on the elaboration of closed lists 
of actors engaged in the two issue-fields. In addition, a wide range of secondary sources, such 
as existing literature, organisations’ publications, press articles and official documents from 
political and institutional authorities, has been used to deepen the analysis of key contextual 
dimensions in the two fields of asylum and unemployment. 
Section 2 starts with a detailed examination of these two issue-fields in which pro-
asylum and pro-unemployed actors operate respectively, emphasising the specific relationship 
between beneficiary and constituency groups. After setting the scene, the section moves on to 
present the theoretical foundations on which my relational approach is based, discussing the 
continuum between structure, networks and action while at the same time systematically 
specifying the comparative criteria which shape my cross-issue-field analysis. The following 
two sections debate the main findings of my research, analysing in detail horizontal networks 
(section 3) and vertical networks (section 4) between pro-beneficiary groups, civil society 
organisations, political parties and core state policy-makers in each of the two issue-fields. In 
particular, I focus on the contrasting patterns of horizontal and vertical ties which have 
developed in the two different issue-fields through inter-organisational alliances. Finally, 
Section 5 takes these two different network patterns as a dependent variable, examining the 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on the analysis of 74 interviews (38 with actors in the unemployment field and 36 with 
actors in the asylum field). 
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independent variables which explain the decision of pro-asylum and pro-unemployed 
organisations to build different webs of ties.. 
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2. Asylum vs. Unemployment: A Relational Approach 
 
During the last two New Labour governments, asylum and unemployment have stood 
out as two crucial and controversial issues. As regards unemployment, this has been one of 
the most prominent political issues throughout the first New Labour mandate between 1997 
and 2001. The unemployed have beard much of the economic, political, and social costs 
undertaken by three previous New Right governments to restructure and re-launch the British 
economy according to neo-liberal models of free market. While a large number of 
(ex)unemployed have managed to re-engage themselves in the new economic boom of 
services of the 1990s, others - in particular, long term and unskilled unemployed - have been 
unable to do so, assisting powerlessly to the continuous erosion of their welfare entitlements, 
the downfall of trade unions’ power, and the burgeoning deprivation in their own 
neighbourhoods. Indeed, long term, unskilled unemployed stand out as a group that suffers 
disproportionately high disadvantages according to a wide range of indicators, such as 
education, income and health. At the same time, direct mobilisation against unemployment 
has  been generally unsuccessful, constantly declining, and merely confined to a few reactive 
protests against dismissals at the local level.  
The New Labour government has promoted the introduction of new policies, 
consisting of significant reforms to the labour market in order to move more people from 
welfare to work. These include the working families’ tax credit, changes to the system of 
national contribution, a national minimum wage, and the New Deal, which was launched in 
1998 and become fully operational within a few years. It started as a specific policy directed 
at young people, but was soon extended to older people, to single parents and to the disabled. 
In particular, a new principle of conditionality can be seen at the core of New Labour’s 
welfare to work agenda. Within the existing New Deal, failure to take up one of the four 
work/training options lead to punitive benefit cuts and suspensions, as it has been shown by 
sanctions imposed on 3,125 young people on the New Deal between January and March 2002 
[CESI, 2002]. Clearly, this linking of certain benefit rights to behavioural conditions is an 
increasing aspect of UK social policy. Policies based on conditional entitlement are becoming 
so central to New Labour’s vision that some scholars have argued that the very idea of 
‘welfare rights’ is systematically undermined [Dwyer, 2002]. At the same time, pressures on 
the unemployed to take any available work or training have marked the final demise of their 
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organisational structures, mobilisation strategies, and ultimately, their disappearance from the 
same public discourse. 
As regards asylum, since 1997 there have been substantial reforms to the legal system 
which have not gone in the direction favoured by pro-asylum organisations. Two main pieces 
of legislation have come into force, namely, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, emphasising the government negative agenda 
of deterring new arrivals rather than its positive will to provide full entitlements and 
protection for those who flee persecution. In particular, the 1999 Act has extended penalties 
on carriers, introduced the voucher scheme as main instrument of welfare support, extended 
policies preventing arrivals at UK ports, and made provision for a new system of compulsory 
dispersal to reduce asylum seekers’ presence in London and the South-East of England. The 
2002 Act has followed on the footsteps of the 1999 Act, extending the application of non-
suspensive appeals and establishing the withdrawal of welfare supports for in-country 
applicants. This adamant introduction of restrictive measures has also been matched by an 
increasing politicisation of the issue, with MPs regularly throwing facts and figures at each 
other about arrivals, applications and deportations. This unprincipled argument about numbers 
has indeed reached the highest level of government, with the Prime Minister pledging in 
February 2003 to halve the number of applications by September of the same year.  
In sum, asylum seekers and the unemployed have been the object of restrictive reforms 
implemented by the last two New Labour governments, as well as by previous New Right 
governments. They have also faced resentment in the general public discourse with disputes 
taking place with the regard to ‘bogus’ and ‘welfare scroungers’. Nevertheless, collective 
action across these two issue-fields have been characterised by limited involvement of groups 
of asylum seekers and the unemployed themselves, and in particular, by rare episodes of their 
direct mobilisation. Although they have engaged in direct protests against government 
throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the unemployed have been unable to 
voice their claims beyond the local level during the last decade, mobilising only very 
occasionally and merely as result of specific industrial disputes. This weakness has also 
prevented the British unemployed from playing any active role during the recent and 
widespread mobilisations against unemployment across Europe [Chabanet, 2002]. As regards 
asylum seekers, they have rarely had the capability to mobilise visibly in the public domain. 
With the exception of a few symbolic protests, they have usually contained their (invisible) 
action within grassroots and community groups at the local level. Given their relatively small 
size, marginal political position, and ownership of very few resources for autonomous 
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mobilisation, asylum seekers and the unemployed have thus had to rely on the direct support 
of organisations willing to act on their behalf. Indeed, space for ‘altruistic’ intervention of 
pro-asylum and pro-unemployed actors has widely broadened in recent years, due to the 
increasing expansion of the voluntary sector in the area of social exclusion and the general 
encouragement of government to enhance social and civil dialogue.  
Hence, the main attention of this paper is focused on the web of ties forged by pro-
asylum and pro-unemployed actors through 1) their horizontal networks amongst themselves 
and with civil society organisations in the public domain, and 2) their vertical networks with 
state actors in the policy domain. This relational approach to the analysis of pro-asylum and 
pro-unemployed collective action builds upon and integrates the burgeoning scholarly 
literature on social networks and social capital [Diani, 2003; Lin 2001]. While scholarly 
interest in relational characteristics of collective action and social movements is at least three 
decades old [Curtis and Zurcher, 1973; Granovetter, 1973; Obershall, 1973; Pickvance, 1975] 
and it can indeed be traced well back in founding works of classic sociology [Simmel, 1908], 
it is only in more recent times that sociologists and political scientists have fully emphasised 
the potentialities of, and extensively engaged with a research approach which evaluates forms 
of collective action starting from the appraisal of their structural properties, thus broadening 
the range of their research topics and increasing the depth of their research results. Indeed, 
political scientists and sociologists working in different fields of social science have 
extensively demonstrated the far-reaching potentialities of the relational approach in tackling 
a large volume of different research questions.  
On the one hand, scholars of social capital have unanimously emphasised the 
importance of resources embedded in social networks, which can be accessed by actors 
wishing to increase likelihood of success in a purposive action. Research has focused on how 
individuals, through their connections, access and make use of social resources embedded in 
social networks, in order to obtain gains in instrumental actions or to preserve gains in 
expressive actions. Indeed, social resources (that is, social capital accessible through direct or 
indirect ties) have better potential than personal resources (that is, resources in full possession 
of individual actors) in furthering and/or preserving individuals’ gains [Lin, 1982, 1999 and 
2001]. These scholars have also focused their attention at the group level, arguing that 
networks of obligations and recognition are the basis on which members of a clear-cut (and 
privileged) group maintain and reinforce their social capital as a collective asset [Bordieu, 
1986]; that social networks not only sustain individuals within social structures but provide 
resources (that is, social capital) to the structures themselves [Coleman, 1990]; and that 
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participation, associations and exchanges are indicators of well-being in societies, since they 
promote collective norms and trust [Putnam, 1993 and 1995]. In sum, these scholars have 
overall proved that social networks enhance the outcomes of collective action. It is indeed 
through social ties that a wide range of embedded resources can be accessed, thus facilitating 
the flow of information about opportunities and choices otherwise not available, influencing 
the agents who play a critical role in decision-making, as well as reinforcing identity, 
recognition, public acknowledgment and support.  
On the other hand, social network analysis has found extensive application in a wide 
range of research questions, focusing on the impact of urbanisation [Fisher, 1982], 
occupational mobility [Breiger, 1990], social support [Wellman and Wortley, 1990], 
centralisation of parties and elites [Padgett and Ansell, 1993], and in particular, on specific 
research questions of social movements analysis and contentious politics, such as the 
influence of individuals’ relational contexts on their decision to mobilise [Klandermans, 1990; 
McAdam, 1986; Passy, 2001], the impact of whole communities’ network structures on the 
development of their collective action [Gould 1991, 1993 and 1995], inter-organisational 
networks and overlapping memberships [Diani, 1992 and 1995], processes of mobilisation 
and counter-mobilisation [Franzosi 1997 and 1999], interaction between public domain and 
policy domain [Broadbent, 1998], mobilisation across traditional cleavages in deeply divided 
societies [Cinalli, 2002 and 2003], and broader reflections between structure and agency [Lin, 
2001].  
Given this extensive employment of the relational approach, it is crucial to provide a 
more explicit definition of its main tenets which will guide the specific investigation of this 
paper. In particular, four central principles distinguish this programme of research from 
‘standard’ social science perspectives. First, actors are interdependent rather than independent 
units, and the relations amongst them are the most meaningful focus of analysis. Second, the 
analytically relevant characteristics which can be predicated for these actors can be 
understood out of their structural and/or relational features. Third, relational ties between 
these actors are the channels for the flow of both material and nonmaterial resources. Last, the 
complete web of actors, their position and their linkages, that is, network structure, provides 
opportunities for (and constraints upon) action.2 Put simply, network analysis operationalises 
a social structure in terms of networks of linkages amongst units, that is, a set of nodes 
                                                 
2 For a detailed treatment of Social Network Analysis, see Wasserman and Faust [1994]. Some scholars have 
looked at network analysis with an emphasis on research methods [Knoke and Kuklinsky, 1982]. For an 
introductory text to social network analysis see Scott [2000]. 
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hierarchically related according to the control of and access to embedded resources in their 
positions, which are entrusted to occupants (that is, agents) acting upon structural constraints 
and opportunities. Structure and its relational characteristics impact upon social agents, which 
aim to maintain and gain resources (both material and non-material) through their networks.  
Throughout my paper I will therefore assume that each actor in the two issue-fields 
can be viewed as a focus from which lines radiate horizontally and vertically to other nodes 
(actors with which it is in contact), thus making reference to some main characteristics of a 
network and its actors. Although I will not express these characteristics with complex 
mathematical formulae, I have to give here some brief definitions for readers who are not 
acquainted with social network analysis. First, I define each of my networks as a set of co-
operative ties linking a set of social actors (or nodes). In short, my networks depict actors (or 
nodes) linked by relations of close co-operation. Second, I will refer to a relation between any 
two actors as an ‘edge’. If there is an edge joining two actors these actors are adjacent. A 
‘path’ is a chain of edges which connect two actors. The number of actors adjacent to an actor 
expresses its ‘degree’ (or point-centrality), whose measure displays the importance of specific 
actors within the entire network. Third, the most important structural characteristic of a 
network, which I shall consider, is density. In particular, a network is relatively dense if a 
large number of actors are linked to each other. The density of a network (or portion of a 
network) may be calculated by a simple computation, which expresses the ratio of the total 
possible links to the total actual links in the network under consideration. Last, my analysis 
will focus especially on network clusters, that is, segments or compartments of networks 
which have relatively high density.  
This paper will thus focus on the relationship between agency  and network structure 
in the two issue-fields of asylum and unemployment, standing somewhere in the middle of the 
debate between scholars who see structural constraints and opportunities as decisive and those 
who consider actors’ action to be the crucial driving force. Fig. 1 in the following page shows 
that A) pro-asylum and pro-unemployed actors (pro-beneficiary) have a similar structural 
position within their specific issue-field, and B) they are in contact through their linkages 
amongst themselves and to other clusters of nodes within the same field. Indeed, in empirical 
terms, both structural factors (positional and relational) are expected to operate at the same 
time in a social structure, with a range of different combinations and their relative effects. 
However, it is crucial to emphasise not only that two issue-fields have the same number of 
levels in the hierarchy, but also that they are comparable in terms of the same distribution of 
the occupants across the levels and valued resources across levels and among occupants. 
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Fig. 1 Positional and Relational Structures in the two Issue-Fields of Asylum and Unemployment 
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The comparability of the two issue-fields is also reinforced by the analysis of the most 
influential addressees. Table 1 in the following page presents this type of data, demonstrating 
that in both issue-fields A) national state actors still play the most crucial role, with the 
highest relevance of two particular national policy-makers followed by the Labour Party (all 
presenting similar scores across the two issue-fields), B) ad hoc administrative institutions, 
such as the National Asylum Support Service and Jobcentre Plus, hold a key position, C) local 
authorities provide relatively important nodes for exchanges between national and sub-
national levels of intervention, and D) civil society actors are granted with a limited amount 
of resources, since only one organisation in each field is included amongst the most important 
targets, namely, the Commission for Racial Equality for asylum, and the Trades Union 
Congress for unemployment. Indeed, the major difference between the two issue-fields seems 
to be limited to the only position of political parties, which are generally less targeted (and 
presumably less influential) in the issue-field of unemployment.  
In sum, my comparative study is based on the analysis of structurally-equivalent 
positions across the two issue-fields of asylum and unemployment, thus strengthening the 
control of positional structures which do not depend upon agents’ decision. This enables me 
to focus on network structures (and their effects), as they are purposively shaped by pro-
asylum and pro-unemployed actors respectively. In particular, as fig. 1 has clearly indicated, 
in each issue-field pro-beneficiary actors can decide to build different combinations of 
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horizontal and vertical relationships. Horizontally, they can forge ties with other pro-
beneficiary actors, and/or look for alliances with other actors within civil society. Vertically, 
they can decide to work in close contact with state policy-makers, which may of course be 
willing to meet social challenges with co-optative and pre-emptive responses [Gamson, 
1990]. At the same time, important links might be forged with political parties, which occupy 
a strategic intermediary position between civil society and policy-makers.  
It is to the detailed analysis of these networks that the next two sections are dedicated. 
In particular, this crucial focus on meaning and function of networks will enable me to 
integrate the large volume of scholarly research that has considered dense or close networks 
to be the means by which cognitive frames can develop, collective action can be advanced, 
and organisational strengthening can be achieved. From this perspective, network density 
enhances trust, norms, and sanctions, thus guaranteeing that network resources can be 
mobilised. Yet, it is crucial to investigate, rather than assuming, this requirement about 
closure or density in social relations and social networks, paying attention to the fact that at 
least since the 1970s research in social networks has also stressed the importance of ‘bridges’, 
and in particular, their role in strengthening influence and facilitating flows of information. 
My analytical distinction between horizontal and vertical networks draws indeed on the 
scholarly treatment of these bridges, which have also been defined as ‘structural holes’ or 
‘weak ties’ [Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973 and 1982; Lin et al., 1981].3
 
Tab. 1 Common Addressees within the Two Issue-Fields  
 
Asylum Unemployment 
Home Affairs Committee 26 Department for Work and Pension 24 
Home Office 25 Treasury 21 
Labour Party 22 Labour Party 20 
National Asylum Support Service 19 Jobcentre Plus 18 
Local Authorities  19 Department for Trade and Industry 17 
Conservative Party 17 Trade Union Congress 14 
Liberal-Democrats 16 Local Authorities 13 
Commission for Racial Equality 14 European Commission 13 
European Commission 12 European Parliament 12 
European Parliament 12 Liberal-Democrats 12 
 
                                                 
3 In the literature the main reference is to ‘weak ties’ rather than to vertical networks. The definition of ‘weak 
ties’ is based on role identification or lack of intimacy, rather than grasp and extent of networks. My definition of 
vertical (and horizontal) ties is based on the extent to which ties cut across different levels of power and 
authority.  
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3. Horizontal Networks in the Two Issue-Fields of Asylum and 
Unemployment: Co-operation amongst Pro-Beneficiary Actors and Their 
Relationships with Civil Society Allies 
 
Having divided the two issue-fields in similar network clusters according to the different 
structural position of their nodes, it is reasonable to start with the comparison of inter-
organisational relationships which pro-asylum and pro-unemployed actors build amongst 
themselves in their respective issue field. Table 2 is the matrix of edges between 16 main pro-
asylum organisations, where each edge indicates the existence of a relationship of close co-
operation between a pair of these actors. The first evident characteristic of this (portion of) 
network amongst pro-asylum organisations is its high density, due to the fact that a large 
number of actors are linked to each other. They have thus built an extensive web of linkages 
and exchanges with other pro-beneficiary groups in the same field. In particular, the majority 
of these organisations has successfully forged ties of co-operation with more than half of the 
actors in the network, and some of them (namely, the Joint Committee for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, Refugee Council, Amnesty International and Oxfam) stand out for their 
remarkable point-centrality.  
 
 
Tab. 2 Inter-Organisational Networks within the Pro-Asylum Field 
 
 
 AA AI CCC CDA CRE CS JCW JRC MFC NAA NCA Ox. RA RC SC Sh. 
AA 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
AI 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CCC 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CDA 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
CRE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
CS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
JCW 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JRC 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
MFC 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NAA 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NCA 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Ox. 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
RA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
RC 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
SC 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Sh. 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Density = 0.62 
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At the same time, all the organisations with lowest point-centrality (namely, the Children’s 
Society, Jesuit Refugee Centre, Campaign for Closing Campsfield and the Commission for 
Racial Equality) interact directly with two or more organisations with the highest point-
centrality, and hence, they are no more than one single edge away from any other organisation 
within the network. This particular shape combines together the main properties of a ‘star’ 
and a ‘clique’, thus promoting not only a fast and efficient flow of information amongst the 
different nodes but also the strengthening of reciprocal solidarity amongst the organisations, 
as well as a wider sense of belongingness within the overall network. 
Clearly, pro-asylum organisations can access, exchange, and develop a wide range of 
material and non-material resources through their extensive web of inter-organisational links. 
Certainly, at the time writing, these ties seem to be particularly useful for increasing flow of 
information across the nodes, for facilitating allocation of responsibilities and flexibility of 
action, and hence, for their instrumental nature. Many of the organisations which are the 
object of my analysis have decided to engage actively in the Asylum Rights Campaign, which 
functions as an information sharing umbrella that informs the campaigning work of its 
members.4 At the same time, it is important to emphasise that the usefulness of networks has 
been evaluated at the level of individual organisations. For example, the Joint Committee for 
the Welfare of Immigrants has debated for years on its internal structure, emphasising the 
convenience of a network, rather than a membership organisation. In the words of one of its 
leaders:  
Networks are much more flexible and much more responsive. There’s a possibility 
of dividing the work up much more quickly so we’ve got people who are in a 
position to respond quickly […] The whole asylum agenda has been based on the 
possibility of establishing, particularly as far as reception issues are concerned, 
basically a co-ordinated strategy which will strap important NGOs in the process 
right from the very beginning.  
 
Nevertheless, due to their clique shape, inter-organisational exchanges have also sustained the 
strengthening of solidarity and promoted the belief of sharing similar purposes for action, thus 
encouraging the formation and reproduction of ties downward to the level of individual 
activists. For example, Oxfam has actively worked to promote and sustain a common agenda 
within the wider pro-asylum voluntary sector, building an extensive network which is based 
on inter-organizational links as well as overlapping memberships, with many supporters 
active in more than one organisation at the same time. In the words of one of its leaders: 
An Oxfam supporter isn’t just an Oxfam supporter. I know myself that I’m a 
member of Oxfam, a supporter of Oxfam, I support Amnesty, Christian Aid, a 
                                                 
4 ARC is also a forum for discussion with campaigning strategies in mind, in order to stand against legislative 
provisions which curtail rights and entitlements of asylum seekers. 
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variety of different groups but I’m the same person. And I really think that our 
supporters love it, and I would use that verb, they love it when we work with other 
people with a common agenda. And they hate it when we’re standing up 
individually. 
 
Likewise, the Refugee Council has also developed links with other organisations which are 
not directly active on refugee issues, in order to make them discovering that refugees is an 
issue for them.5 Furthermore, reciprocal solidarity and sense of common belongingness have 
at times been mobilised explicitly through these dense networks. In occasion of the voucher 
campaign, for example, a wide number of pro-asylum organisations have stood together to 
boycott the implementation of the voucher scheme, voicing fervently their moral outrage.6  
Not only has this campaign proved that pro-asylum organisations can successfully unite their 
efforts to forward political change, but it has especially demonstrated that the instrumental 
function of networks is only a part, albeit the most evident, of their meaning, since 
overwhelming symbolic resources can at times be mobilised through these same networks. 
The determined participation of the Refugee Council to the campaign of protest - 
notwithstanding its role of assistant agency under the same Act which had introduced the 
vouchers - provides an important evidence for this argument.  
Moving to the analysis of the (portion of) network amongst pro-beneficiary actors in 
the issue field of unemployment, it is evident that pro-unemployed organisations have decided 
to shape their reciprocal linkages according to a completely different pattern. Table 3 in the 
following page introduces the matrix of edges between 16 main organisations working on 
behalf of the unemployed, where each edge represents the existence of a relationship of close 
co-operation between a pair of these actors. This time, the first evident characteristic of this 
network consists of its very low density, with a large number of actors disconnected with each 
other or merely related through long paths. Indeed, only a few organisations are characterised 
by a somewhat significant point-centrality, namely, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, the 
Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion, and the Work Foundation. Thanks to a single 
interaction with one of these latter organisations, many other actors can communicate with 
each other, even if only through long paths which shape the network in the model of a star. A 
significant number of pro-unemployed organisations, however, have built no relationship of 
co-operation with the rest of the network.  
                                                 
5 For example, RC has co-operated on housing with Shelter, while encouraging Age Concern to take up the issue 
of older refugees.  
6 The scheme introduced a new system of subsistence benefits for asylum seekers in the restrictive form of 
vouchers. Furthermore, supermarkets were entitled to keep the change when asylum seekers used their vouchers. 
Oxfam and the Refugee Council have successfully led the campaign. Amongst the many actions, they devised a 
supermarket action card, distributing over 100,000 of these cards to groups across the country. 
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Tab. 3 Inter-Organisational Networks within the Pro-Unemployed Field 
 
 
 ASI BTE CC CES EO FS IEA IES JRF NPI NYA OPF PSI TP WF YF 
ASI 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BTE 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
CES 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
EO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IEA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IES 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
JRF 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
NPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NYA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPF 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
PSI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
WF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
YF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Density = 0.16 
 
 
 
In sum, although the issue-field is still defined by loose contacts amongst different actors, 
organisations working on behalf of the unemployed appear to be unwilling to forge a broad 
web of reciprocal linkages of close co-operation, while aiming to keep some basic degree of 
information exchange within the network. 
The low structural density of this network seems to provide only specific opportunities 
for action, encouraging pro-unemployed organisations to specialise in few specific techniques 
which are exclusively employed at the national level. Indeed, the unemployment voluntary 
sector is occupied by two main kinds of actors: 1) organisations which consider the 
promotion, production and dissemination of research and knowledge to be the major means to 
intervene on unemployment policy (for example, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation) and 2) organisations which, albeit also engaged in research, 
have decided to play a direct role in the formulation, implementation and development of 
government policies (for example, the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion and the 
Institute for Employment Studies). Low structural density and the complete lack of clique-
shaped relationships in any part of the network are also matched by a lack of significant 
connections with groups of beneficiaries at the grassroots level. Indeed, the National 
Unemployed Centres Combine (CC) stands out as the only organisation which actually 
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involves unemployed people in its own organisational activities, working for the bottom-up 
promotion of their interest rather than for the elaboration of top-down solutions to tackle 
unemployment.  CC also campaigns directly on behalf of the unemployed, linking together 
various local ‘unemployed workers centres’ across Britain.  
Further examination of horizontal networks, however, implies to broaden the focus of 
this network analysis, moving from within to outside the pro-beneficiary sector. Indeed, it is 
important to assess the extent to which pro-asylum and pro-unemployed have respectively 
decided to forge linkages with potential allies in the wider civil society, matching the shape of 
these relationships with the network patterns hitherto examined in each issue-field. In this 
case, it is crucial to measure relationships of co-operation between pro-beneficiary actors on 
the one hand, and main trade unions, political parties, churches, professional and non-
governmental organisations on the other hand. Tab. 4 compares network patterns between 
pro-beneficiary actors and civil society allies across the two issue fields. It presents two 
matrixes of edges, which indicate the existence of a relationship of close co-operation 
between each pair of actors (in each pair there is a pro-beneficiary organisation and a civil 
society organisation).  
 
 
Tab. 4 Horizontal Networks in the Two Issue-Fields: Pro-Beneficiary vs. Civil Society 
 
 
 BMA TGW CAB TUC ILP Ch. LP CP LD 
AA 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
AI 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
CCC 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
CDA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
CRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CS 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
JCW 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JRC 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
MFC 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
NAA 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
NCA 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ox. 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
RA 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
RC 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
SC 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Sh. 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
 
Density = 0.53 
 
 
 TUC TGW CBI CAB FSB Ch. LP CP LD 
ASI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
BTE 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
CC 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
CES 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
EO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
IES 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JRF 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
NPI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NYA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OPF 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
PSI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
WF 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
YF 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
 
Density = 0.23 
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The patterns of these two (portions of) networks, as shown in tab. 4, confirm that pro-asylum 
and pro-unemployed organisations greatly differ in terms of their respective decisions to build 
horizontal linkages.  
On the one hand, the network structure built by organisations working on behalf of the 
unemployed (right box of tab. 4) stand out once again for its low density, due to the fact that 
these organisations are only loosely linked with other actors of civil society. Although it is 
worth highlighting that a large majority of actors have built at least one tie of co-operation 
with trade unions, churches, or political parties, no node is characterised by high point-
centrality, and a few organisations are still completely detached from the overall network. At 
the same time, tab. 4 demonstrates that CC has decided to build an important web of 
relationships with civil society allies, and hence, occupies a relatively important position 
within the overall pro-unemployed voluntary sector in spite of its limited linkages with other 
pro-beneficiary organisations. However, it is crucial to emphasise that this organisation has 
increasingly reduced scope and intensity of its action since the mid-1990s, facing some major 
obstacles in promoting the direct involvement of the unemployed. In particular, its network of 
local centres has gradually shrank due to increasing funding constraints,7 halt of street 
protest,8 and new political conditions, which have forced groups to demobilise, strengthen 
their links with the unions, and to adapt to government strategies. While some of these centres 
have dealt with the restrictive legislation of three successive New Right governments,9 other 
centres have decided to support actively government policies since the election of New 
Labour in 1997.10 Thus, CC has worked to strengthen its ties with trade unions, churches and 
other civil society organisations in order to fill in its distance from the main policy-makers.11  
On the other hand, the network structure built by pro-asylum organisations (left box of 
tab. 4) stand out for its high density, due to the fact that they are linked with a wide range of 
                                                 
7 For example, the general re-organisation of local government in 1986 brought about the abolition of the Greater 
London council, which funded many unemployed workers centres in London.  
8 Although several centres have continued to engage regularly in forms of mobilisation under the direction of 
CC, the last significant episodes of direct protest were organised in 1995, when three marches were organised to 
protest against the introduction of the ‘job seekers allowance’ by the Conservative government. One took place 
between Newcastle and Sheffield; another took place between Liverpool and Sheffield; while a local march was 
organised between Derby and Sheffield. 
9 Accordingly, these centres became providers of services to the unemployed rather than offering the means to 
organise and mobilise them per se [Bagguley, 1991]. 
10 For example, the old ‘unemployment centre’ in Sheffield has changed its name in Centre for Full 
Employment’. It has accepted to co-operate with the New Labour government in supporting programmes that re-
engage unemployed people back into the labour market. In particular, the centre for full employment has taken 
active part in the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM), employing hundreds of people in project of community 
value and creating work in the third sector of the economy. 
11 At the end of 2003, for example, postcards reporting article 23 of the UN declaration of Human Rights (stating 
free choice of employment) were sent to each MP at Westminster, while a CC leader participated to the annual 
TUC conference in order to lobby on the issue of unemployment benefits and welfare reform. 
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civil society allies. In particular, it is worth noticing that JCWI and RC, which were also 
characterised by high point-centrality within the pro-beneficiary cluster, score a high degree 
also in this larger portion of network. This indicates that they emerge as the most important 
organisations for pulling resources horizontally across the pro-beneficiary sector and civil 
society. At the same time, it is crucial to emphasise that the CRE occupies a strategic position 
of contact with civil society allies, and hence, should be considered to be an authoritative 
organisation within the overall voluntary sector, in spite of its limited linkages with other pro-
beneficiary actors. In sum it is clear that pro-asylum organisations have decided not only to 
interact inwardly amongst themselves, but to forge at the same time a burgeoning web of 
horizontal ties which extends outwardly to all the main organisations of civil society. 
Likewise reciprocal horizontal networks, these ‘external’ horizontal networks have further 
facilitated flow of information and definition of common beliefs. I have already mentioned 
the widespread campaign to ‘scrap the vouchers’. This was the most visible episode of protest 
on behalf of asylum seekers, which brought together a wide range of organisations united not 
only in their moral disdain for government, but also in their concern for justice and rights. In 
particular, it is crucial to emphasise that a key union, namely, the TGWU, has indeed led this 
campaign (together with RC and Oxfam), while national and local churches have played an 
important role alongside with professional organisations (such as the British Medical 
Association), associations of local authorities, and other voluntary organisations commonly 
not engaged in the asylum issue field (such as Barnardos and the Body Shop).  
However, it is worth mentioning at least some other less visible instances which show 
the increased co-ordinated intervention between civil society and pro-beneficiary groups. 
First, AA works in partnership with the Central London Advice Service (CLAS) and with the 
Refugee Education and Training Advisory Service (RETAS) in the Rope project. While 
RETAS gives guidance on employment and access to education, CLAS has provided further 
advice on accessing the National Asylum Support Service. Second, AI has set up an ad hoc 
inter-organisational forum for debating and exchanging information on asylum seekers. This 
‘Working Group’ links AI with RC, the Refugee Legal Centre, the Immigration Law 
Practitioners Association, JCWI, UNHCR, JRS, UNA, MFCVT, Friends House, and Oxfam. 
AI also co-operates with Liberty and the Law Society, while relying at the same time on a 
wider web of ties through the action of ‘Reach Out’, which was formed at the end of the 
1990s in order to strengthen the UNHCR’s protection mandate (in crisis in the aftermath of 
events in Rwanda). Reach Out has linked AI with the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, 
Oxfam, SC, and the UNHCR’s protection unit. Last, the Refugee Council and Refugee Action 
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have been active within a national multi-agency partnership alongside with other refugee 
voluntary organisations. In particular, RA has developed its relationships especially at the 
regional level throughout the North of England, building linkages with the North West 
Development Agency, regional Community Health Council, regional volunteer bureaux, 
North West Consortium, accommodation providers, Princes Trust, and Learning Direct, as 
well as hundreds of ties with different organisations at the local level, amongst which refugee 
support groups, refugee community organisations, education suppliers, and local voluntary 
actions 
Hence, it is crucial to emphasise that this extensive web has also spread through co-
operation with a wide range of actors at the grassroots level, such as community and faith 
groups, education service and student groups, refugee community organisations and local 
voluntary groups, as well as asylum support networks that include the beneficiaries 
themselves. The pro-asylum organisational field is clearly characterised by dense exchanges 
which have filled in the gap between formal national organisations and local grassroots 
groups. For example, AA is in close contact with many refugee groups in areas where asylum 
seekers have been dispersed, working closely with these groups in order to produce a 
concerted and unified front of refugee organisations. The JCWI relies on a network of more 
than 2000 groups and individuals throughout Britain, working in direct contact with local 
groups, committees, and families. Formal organisations cannot affiliate to the National 
Coalition for Anti-Deportation Campaign, which has built only some selected links of co-
operation with other national voluntary organisations to guarantee that the control of its own 
activities remains firmly the hands of people facing deportation. 12 In the words of a NCADC 
member: 
 It does constrain us in that the trade union organisations can’t really affiliate, can’t 
make donations, which is a bit of a handicap but we can’t see a way round it because 
we are quite adamant that those fighting deportations will stay in control […] They 
ultimately are our employers. They can make the decisions. 
 
This practice has facilitated the broadening of links at the local level, where NCADC has 
forged an extensive web of ties through co-operation with grassroots refugee groups, local 
committees of the Socialist Workers Party, churches, and trade unions branches.  
In addition, Oxfam works with faith-based groups such as Islamic Relief, informal 
organisations and committees, as well as with local branches of trade unions. In particular, the 
                                                 
12 A good relationship of co-operation links NCADC with the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
Torture and National Assembly Against Racism. 
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voucher campaign has enabled Oxfam to develop extensive ties of co-operation with 
organisations working directly on asylum. In the words of one of its members: 
I went to a brilliant group in Newham, the east end of London, Newham Refugee 
Forum, who were using Oxfam cards in the east end. They had never had any 
contact with Oxfam, barely knew who Oxfam were, but wanted to part of this 
campaign […] The Northern Refugee Centre, again a group with no real links with 
Oxfam, got in touch and started distributing thousands of cards in Sheffield […] 
And all the cards came back […] from every part of the country, all political 
persuasions. 
 
Save the Children works with grassroots groups on a wide range of issues, making wide use 
of partnerships for the delivery of specific services. RC stands out for its efforts to re-integrate 
asylum seekers and refugees within the wider polity. In the words of a RC member: 
Refugees are part of our community and therefore as such the fundamental thing for 
me is to stop them being marginalised, stop them being seen as a separate thing and 
to get other people involved […] It’s to try and make sure that we can influence as 
much of that as possible.  
 
Indeed, RC has intensely worked at the local level throughout the country, alongside with 
local refugee community organisations and a large number of grassroots groups.  
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3. Vertical Networks in the Two Issue-Fields: Co-operation between Pro-
Beneficiary Actors and Policy-Makers 
 
My analysis has so far demonstrated that pro-beneficiary actors can take different decisions 
when shaping their horizontal inter-organisational networks amongst themselves and with 
civil society allies. In particular, this examination seems to indicate that network closure is a 
distinctive advantage in the mobilisation of both material and non-material resources. As 
regards the asylum issue-field, high density in the pro-beneficiary cluster, and in the larger 
network portion which connects this cluster with civil society allies, is indeed matched by 1) 
the substantial and constant flow of information throughout the network, which, in its most 
visible outcome, has led to the setting up of a national sharing information umbrella, namely, 
the ARC, 2) the decision to co-ordinate widespread intervention in a multitude of specific 
actions, which has brought about the mushrooming of numerous ad hoc issue coalitions across 
the national and the local level, and 3) the gradual development of an unifying sense of 
solidarity and belongingness in the network, which, in the most visible case of the voucher 
campaign,  has also proved to be capable to prevail on individual actors’ pursuit of selective 
incentives. As regards the unemployment issue-field, linkages of co-operation amongst pro-
beneficiary actors are so loose that it is hardly possible to clearly distinguish a defined cluster 
of organisations co-operating with each other. Organisations working on behalf of the 
unemployed appear to be interested in sustaining just the minimum amount of horizontal ties 
(with each other and with civil society allies) to guarantee some basic information flow. They 
do not share any sense of common belongingness or solidarity, nor do they unite in pervasive 
common action, or form ad hoc coalitions. 
However, further analysis of the network structure has to include the examination of 
vertical linkages which pro-beneficiary organisations may decide to build with institutional 
actors and core policy-makers. Having assessed the extent to which pro-asylum and pro-
unemployed organisations have forged ties of close co-operation with relevant policy actors, 
government departments, and local administrations, I will match the shape of these vertical 
linkages with the shape of horizontal networks. Tab. 5 in the following page compares 
networks between pro-beneficiary organisations and core policy actors in the two issue-fields 
by presenting two matrixes of edges, which highlight the occurrence of linkages between 
different pairs of actors (in each pair there is a pro-beneficiary organisation and a policy 
actor). In particular, tab. 5 shows a remarkable shift of density structure in both issue-fields, 
reversing the trend of previous findings on horizontal network patterns. 
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Tab. 5 Vertical Networks in the Two Issue-Fields: Pro-Beneficiary vs. Core Policy Actors 
 
 
 H.O. NAS Par. L.A. LGA 
AA 0 1 0 0 0 
AI 0 0 1 0 0 
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 
CDA 0 0 0 0 0 
CRE 1 1 1 1 1 
CS 0 0 1 1 0 
JCW 1 0 0 0 0 
JRC 0 0 0 0 0 
MFC 1 1 1 1 0 
NAA 0 0 1 0 0 
NCA 0 0 0 1 0 
Ox. 0 1 0 1 0 
RA 0 1 0 1 1 
RC 0 1 0 1 1 
SC 1 1 0 0 0 
Sh. 0 1 0 1 0 
 
Density = 0.33 
 
 DWP Tr. DTI L.A. JCP 
ASI 1 1 0 0 0 
BTE 1 0 1 1 1 
CC 0 0 0 1 0 
CES 1 0 0 1 1 
EO 1 0 1 1 0 
FS 0 0 0 0 0 
IEA 0 0 0 0 0 
IES 1 1 0 1 1 
JRF 1 1 1 0 0 
NPI 0 0 0 0 0 
NYA 0 0 0 0 0 
OPF 1 0 0 1 0 
PSI 1 0 1 0 1 
TP 1 1 1 1 1 
WF 1 1 1 1 1 
YF 0 1 1 1 1 
 
Density = 0.49 
 
 
In the asylum issue-field, the high density of horizontal networks in the public domain 
(mutual ties amongst pro-unemployed organisations and their linkages with civil society 
allies) suddenly drops if density is calculated vertically on the base of vertical ties of co-
operation between pro-asylum actors and core policy actors. This type of shift appears to be 
even more dramatic in the unemployment issue-field, especially if we assume that strong ties 
across hierarchically different positions are not the normative expectation. While confirming 
that pro-asylum and pro-unemployed organisations have taken different decisions when 
shaping their linkages of co-operation, the data seem to suggest that an inverse relationship 
between horizontal and vertical networks exists in these two issue-fields. The analysis of 
(portions of) networks shows indeed that the two directions are not taken at the same time.  
Hence, in spite of its importance, it cannot be argued that (horizontal) network closure 
is a necessary requirement in the mobilisation of resources, as this argument denies the 
significance of bridges, structural holes, weaker ties or vertical networks. Since the root of 
preferring different combinations of networks lies rather in actors’ interests and concerns, it is 
empirically more viable to analyse for what outcomes and under what conditions different 
combinations of horizontal and vertical networks are preferred to generate a better return. 
From this point of view, pro-unemployed actors no longer stand out as socially and politically 
marginalised organisations, even if they have decided to build only a loose web of horizontal 
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ties. Mentioning only a few examples, it is evident that pro-unemployed organisations have 
successfully built an extensive web of ties which brings them crucially close to influential 
policy-makers. The Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion has closely worked with 
policy-makers since 1997, when its strategy has changed as a result of the establishment of 
the New Labour government. CESI no longer aims to target the wider public or grassroots 
groups of unemployed (a normal practice throughout the long New Right era), but it plays a 
crucial role beside government bodies in the design and formulation of different measures 
which aim to increase the employability of the unemployed, such as the transitional 
programme STEP-UP, the New Deal for young people, and the New Deal for long term 
unemployed. Likewise, the Institute for Employment Studies works in close contact with the 
Department of Work and Pension and Jobcentre-Plus, dealing with unemployment and labour 
market issues with the final objective to influence policy from within, rather than from 
outside. In the words of one of its members: 
We have always worked with policy makers and government, with them and for 
them. We have very good links with them […] We find it more fruitful to use the 
inside track, than the outside track. 
 
In particular, IES has extensively been involved in the elaboration of the New Deal, giving 
evidence to select committees and circulating most of its work throughout government 
departments, as well as placing many reports in the House of Commons library and briefing 
ministers and politicians.  
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has organised and co-hosted seminars with the 
Department of Work and Pension, bringing together senior policy-makers and researchers to 
discuss unemployment. JRF has also launched many reports at day conferences, which have 
been attended by ministers and keynote policy-makers. Tomorrow's People relies on a solid 
web of ties with government bodies and core policy actors. Indeed, extensive relationships 
across the policy field are considered to be the best resource to help people excluded from the 
labour market out of long-term unemployment, welfare dependence, and homelessness into 
jobs and self-sufficiency. In the words of a TP member: 
Speaking to policy makers directly is much more effective […]The public does not 
have sufficient technical interest in the issues of concern and it is more effective 
therefore to deal with policy makers.  
 
Lastly, the National Council for One Parent Families focuses most of its efforts in 
strengthening direct contacts with policy-makers and civil servants, in order to participate to 
the development of policies and final bills. In particular, OPF works closely with the 
Employment Service on the New Deal for Lone Parents and it has been responsible for 
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training New Deal for Lone Parents advisers. It has co-operated with the Treasury and Inland 
Revenue in the development of the tax credits system. OPF has also influenced social security 
legislation and the 1998 Welfare Reform and Pension Bill, briefing MPs for ad hoc debates.  
In the asylum issue-field, it has already been emphasised that pro-beneficiary actors 
have decided to privilege the building of horizontal ties amongst themselves and with civil 
society allies, rather than vertical linkages with policy-makers and state actors. Yet, the data 
in tab. 5 suggest that pro-asylum organisations, albeit opposing government policies, do not 
overlook the potentialities of pulling resources through direct linkages with nodes in the 
policy field.  Mentioning a few examples, the CRE has built an extensive web of vertical ties, 
owing to the special acknowledgement of its functions under the terms of the 1976 Race 
Relations Act. In particular, the organisation works actively with public bodies to promote 
laws, policies, and practices which take full account of the Race Relations Act and the 
protection it gives against discrimination. SC plays a key role in the Young Unaccompanied 
Asylum Seekers stakeholders group,13 while participating at the same time in other 
stakeholders groups where the groundwork for legislation is made and policy is affected. SC 
also chairs the Refugee Children Consortium14 while working with the Children and Families 
from Overseas Network.15 The RC is one of the assistant agencies set up in the aftermath of 
the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. In particular, RC is part of a multi-agency partnership 
with other refugee voluntary organisations, which aim to plug asylum seekers into the NASS 
providing them with support and independent advice on a wide range of relevant issues.16 RC 
also works with local authorities to provide a service of home-hostels.  
Therefore, my findings can be summarised as follows. In the asylum issue-field, I have 
detected some important linkages across the public and policy domains. These vertical 
networks have enabled pro-beneficiary actors to increase depth and extension of their 
intervention on behalf of asylum seekers, while guaranteeing the acquisition of important 
resources such as influence, visibility, and financial means. However, my analysis has 
especially emphasised that pro-asylum organisations have decided to forge a very dense web 
of mutual relationships, as well as strong ties of co-operation with civil society allies, thus 
                                                 
13 This is a Home Office working group which brings together SC, RC, the National Children’s Bureau, 
representatives from the Home Office and the Department of Health, as well as many local authorities. SC has 
also set up together with RC and Barnardos a panel of advisers that is funded by the Home Office.   
14 This network was set up in the aftermath of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act to work for the safety of 
refugee children and young people. 
15 This is a forum which guarantees a regular contact between voluntary organisations and local authorities 
across London. 
16 These organisations are the Scottish Refugee Council, Welsh Refugee Council, Refugee Action, Refugee 
Arrivals Project, and Migrant Helpline. 
 25
promoting two main outcomes of interest. First, these horizontal networks have had the 
important function of increasing flow of information and material resources. For example, the 
combination of findings from tables 1 and 5 demonstrates that horizontal networks are also 
useful to reach policy-makers, even if only through long paths, thus guaranteeing a 
convenient allocation of resources, tasks, and responsibilities. Second, horizontal networks 
have also been suitable for sustaining symbolic and expressive actions, which are based on 
reciprocal recognition amongst pro-beneficiary organisations and mutual acknowledgment to 
reciprocate respective concerns. Indeed, in the most critical moments, pro-asylum 
organisations with important links in the policy field have preferred to support the other actors 
in the pro-beneficiary field, in spite of strong selective incentives to show allegiance to 
institutions and policy-makers. Furthermore, pro-asylum organisations have demonstrated to 
be capable to merge their own efforts within a unified front, drawing at the same time on the 
support of grassroots groups of beneficiaries and civil society allies.  
As regards the unemployment issue-field, I have demonstrated that horizontal inter-
organisational relationships are extremely loose, with only a minimum amount of ties of co-
operation forged in the public domain (amongst pro-beneficiary organisations and with civil 
society allies). Accordingly, actors working on behalf of the unemployed do not share any 
sense of common belongingness or solidarity, nor have they ever united in pervasive common 
action, or formed ad hoc coalitions. Rather, the entire issue-field is dominated by the 
development of extensive vertical ties, which link organisations across the public and policy 
domains. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that in this issue-field organisations aim to 
access different social positions in order to acquire additional resources. On the one hand, 
policy-makers are interested in the support which pro-unemployed voluntary organisations 
can provide in terms of welfare services, production of knowledge, sharing of expertise, and 
public legitimisation. On the other hand, pro-unemployed organisations obtain in exchange a 
privileged access to higher political positions and financial resources, thus reinforcing their 
organisational strength and public acknowledgement. In sum, the entire issue-field is 
‘vertically’ stretched, with increasing competition amongst pro-unemployed actors to reach 
the top level of the policy domain and gradual detachment of the beneficiaries (the 
unemployed themselves) at the bottom of the public domain. 
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4. Explaining Choice: Comparing Network Patterns in the two Issue-Fields 
 
This analysis of inter-organisational linkages in the two issue-fields of asylum and 
unemployment in Britain has focused on two distinct patterns of networks which can be 
forged by pro-beneficiary actors. On the one hand, the issue-field of asylum is characterised 
by the predominance of a network pattern which is horizontally stretched, since pro-
beneficiary actors have developed strong horizontal ties in the public domain and weak 
vertical ties in the policy domain. On the other hand, the issue-field of unemployment is 
characterised by the predominance of a network pattern which is vertically stretched, since 
pro-beneficiary actors have built weak horizontal ties in the public domain and strong vertical 
ties in the policy domain. Fig. 2 makes clear this distinction by presenting the results of my 
analysis in a typology of horizontal and vertical networks. Indeed, the space within the 
Cartesian axes could be simplified in four main areas representing the coupling of 1) a 
particular type of interaction (dense/loose) which pro-beneficiary organisations forge in the 
public domain amongst themselves and with civil society allies and 2) a particular type of 
interaction (dense/loose) which the same actors forge with actors in the policy domain.17
 
Fig. 2 Representation of Combinations of Horizontal and Vertical Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vertical 
Network 
Structure 
 
 Horizontal Network Structure 
Pro-Unemployed
Pro-Asylum 
                                                 
17 This typology could also be useful to integrate research on collective action along the Cartesian axes of the 
graph. Thus, institutionalisation is likely to occur at the top-right of the area (combination of dense horizontal 
networks and dense vertical networks); co-optation is likely to occur at the top-left of the area (combination of 
loose horizontal networks and dense vertical networks); conflict is likely to occur at the bottom-right of the area 
(combination of dense horizontal networks and loose vertical networks) and expressions of counter-cultural 
action are likely to occur at the bottom-left of the area (loose horizontal networks and loose vertical networks). 
 27
Having examined these two distinct patterns of networks in the two previous sections, it is 
now necessary to analyse the broad set of factors that has influenced pro-beneficiary 
organisations in the two issue-fields in the building of their linkages and in the choice of their 
allies. As I have already emphasised, teachings of ‘political opportunity structure’ will be 
applied to serve this purpose. It is necessary to emphasise, however, that this last section is 
still underdeveloped, standing primarily as an exploratory effort. The careful consideration of 
contributions and advices from the floor is indeed considered to be a necessary step before 
furthering this complex stage of the research. 
The ‘political opportunity structure’ approach [Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; 
Tarrow 1989 and 1998; Tilly 1978] shares many common features with the broadly influential 
‘neo-institutionalist’ perspective [Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and Olsen, 1984], but it is 
characterised at the same time by a stronger attention for collective action within the public 
domain, and hence, seems to be particularly useful to explain the different decisions that pro-
beneficiary organisations take in the two issue-fields with regard to their inter-organisational 
relationships. While different authors have provided different definitions and 
operationalisations of the concept of political opportunity structure [Diani and van der 
Hejden, 1994; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1989; Tarrow, 1989], my attention here is focused on 
some main dimensions which are particularly relevant in my cross-issue comparative study, 
namely, legal arrangements, alliance structures, and prevailing elite strategies. Starting with 
the analysis of legal arrangements, it is important to emphasise that even if asylum seekers 
and the unemployed stand out both for their weak and marginal position in British politics and 
society, these two groups face different degrees of social and economic exclusion. Indeed, 
asylum seekers and the unemployed access different bundles of legal and political rights, 
which sanction the ‘privileged’ position of the unemployed through their entitlements of 
British nationals. In sum, a comprehensive examination of the constitutional and social nature 
of citizenship in Britain can offer some valuable insights on the relationships between 
different dimensions of social exclusion [White, 1999] and socially excluded groups such as 
the unemployed and asylum seekers. Indeed, my analysis demonstrates that the holding of 
British citizenship (with its entitlements and duties) impacts upon network patterns in the two 
issue-fields, influencing in particular the building of ties which pro-asylum and pro-
unemployed organisations have built with groups of beneficiaries at the grassroots level. 
Unlike the unemployed, asylum seekers face even high barriers to obtaining official residence 
rights and are extremely dependent upon pro-beneficiary organisations for their daily needs. 
Accordingly, pro-asylum organisations need to work actively with local asylum support 
 28
networks and grassroots groups of beneficiaries, thus filling the gap between beneficiary and 
pro-beneficiary positions. In sum, different legal and constitutional arrangements change the 
very substantive content of ‘working on behalf of’, thus influencing the decision of building 
different ties of co-operation in the two issue-fields. 
However, the focus of this paper goes beyond the analysis of (portions of) networks 
between pro-beneficiaries and beneficiaries, thus entailing the consideration of two further 
dimensions, namely, the structures of alliances and the strategies of policy actors. As regards 
structures of alliances, further analysis of political parties seems to be of particular interest, 
since they are crucial actors intermediating between the public domain and the policy domain 
(fig. 1). In particular, it is worth assessing the extent to which their particular relational 
properties impact on the different decisions which pro-beneficiary actors take when shaping 
their own inter-organisational networks. Tab. 6 underscores the relational properties of 
political parties within and between public and policy domains in the two issue-fields by 
presenting two matrixes of edges. Although the first most apparent datum consists of the 
similar density in the two issue-fields, a further analysis of the edges show that this similar 
density is in fact the result of very different combinations of networks of alliances between 
civil society, intermediary political parties, and core policy actors. Tab. 6 emphasises that 
political parties through their intermediary position have built different relationships of 
alliance across public and policy domains in the two issue-fields. In particular, the 
intermediary role of political parties in the issue-field of asylum is clearly biased towards the 
policy domain, if this is compared with the same type of data in the unemployment issue-
field.  
 
 
Tab. 6 Networks in the Two Issue-Fields: Civil Society, Political Parties, and Core Policy Actors 
 
 
 
 BMA TGW CAB TUC ILPA Ch. LP CP LD 
H.O. 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
L.A. 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
LGA 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
NAS 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Par. 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
 
Density = 0.42 
 
 
 TUC TGW CBI CAB FSB Ch. LP CP LD 
DTI 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
DWP 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
JCP 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
L.A. 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tr. 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 
Density = 0,49 
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Certainly, further investigation of co-operation and alliance structures between civil society, 
political parties and policy actors needs to be carried out. For example, it is important to 
appraise whether the extensive networks of co-operative linkages between political parties 
and policy actors is reinforced by mutual inter-organisational ties between political parties, 
since elites’ agreement is one main dimension of the political opportunity structure. 
Nevertheless, it is rather evident that the different degree of alliance and inclusion of political 
parties within the policy domain in the two issue-fields is matched by different network 
patterns between political parties and pro-beneficiary organisations, as it is clearly shown by 
the two matrixes in tab. 7. Although previous data have shown that pro-asylum organisations 
have decided to build an extensive web of horizontal relationships amongst themselves and 
with allies in civil society, the analysis of edges in the two matrixes shows that the specific 
portion of networks with political parties is characterised by low density (which is just 
slightly higher than density between pro-beneficiary and policy-makers), as a result of the 
extensive inclusion of political parties in the policy field (fig. 1).   
 
 
Tab. 7 Networks between Political Parties and Pro-Beneficiary 
 
 
 
 LP CP LD 
AA 0 0 0 
AI 0 0 1 
CCC 0 0 1 
CDA 0 0 0 
CS 0 0 0 
CRE 1 1 1 
JCW 1 1 1 
JRC 0 0 0 
MFC 1 1 0 
NAA 1 0 1 
NCA 1 1 1 
Ox. 0 0 0 
RA 0 0 0 
RC 1 1 1 
SC 0 0 0 
Sh. 0 0 0 
 
Density = 0,37 
 
 
 
 
 LP CP LD 
ASI 0 1 1 
BTE 0 1 0 
CC 0 0 0 
CES 1 0 0 
EO 0 0 0 
FS 0 0 0 
IEA 0 1 0 
IES 0 0 0 
JRF 0 1 1 
NPI 0 0 0 
NYA 0 0 0 
OPF 0 1 0 
PSI 0 0 0 
TP 0 1 0 
WF 1 1 0 
YF 0 0 0 
 
Density = 0.23 
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As regards strategies of policy actors, their specific position is a crucial aspect of the 
structure of power relationships in the two issue-fields, which certainly impacts on the 
network patterns that pro-beneficiary organisations decide to forge. In the unemployment 
issue-field, state policy responsiveness and co-optative strategies of policy-makers have 
discouraged the employment of visible political action in the public domain (to be sustained 
through dense horizontal networks), strengthening the role of small specialist organisations 
that target relevant policy-makers. Indeed, the definite demise of the unemployed protest 
movement in the public domain has occurred at the same time when the New Labour has 
taken on responsibility for government. Not only has this ‘opening up’ of institutional 
channels of access led pro-unemployed organisations to strengthen their direct forms of 
institutional involvement in the political process, but it has attracted a wider range of 
voluntary organisations willing to seize the new resources, and whose involvement has led to 
further marginalisation of grassroots groups of the unemployed. By contrast, in the asylum 
issue-field, pro-beneficiary organisations have generally faced a more restrictive political 
context, which has not changed with the establishment of the New Labour government in 
1997. Indeed, in the last decade there have been five Acts of Parliament and a raft of measures 
which have increasingly deteriorated asylum seekers’ rights and weakened pro-asylum 
positions. Pro-asylum organisations have aimed to strengthen their horizontal networks, in 
order to tie in other campaign organisations and transform the beneficiary-specific claims in 
visible political demands in opposition to state policy-makers. Accordingly, they have firmly 
stood against the New Labour government’s introduction of successive restrictive provisions 
The impact of this closed structure of political opportunities has also been reinforced 
by pro-asylum organisations’ perception of working in a closed and hostile environment, with 
public and official discourses largely shaped against rights and interests of asylum seekers. 
This hostile environment has fostered a general feeling of pessimism, as it is clearly 
emphasised in tab. 8, where the data assess the extent to which organisations in the asylum 
issue-field believe that the general public agrees or disagrees with their position. 
 
Tab. 8 Perception of Operating in Closed/Open Environment’ in the Unemployment Field 
 Number of Actors 
Public Agrees 4 
Public Disagrees 22 
Uncertain 11 
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The same type of data has been gathered to appraise the perception of working in a closed or 
open environment in the unemployment issue-field. Tab. 9 refers to two particular aspects of 
unemployment, namely, job creation and social benefits, as they are the most common focus 
of organisations acting on behalf of the unemployed. 
 
Tab. 9 Perception of Operating in Closed/Open Environment’ in the Unemployment Field 
  
Perception of public support  
on social benefits 
 
Total
 
Uncertain Public agrees Public disagrees  
Uncertain 9 5 0 14 
 
Public agrees 
 
5 
 
12 
 
4 
 
21 
 
Perception of 
public 
support on 
job creation  
Public disagrees 
 
1 
 
0 
 
2 
 
3 
Total  15 17 6 38 
 
 
In this case, the data seem to demonstrate that the unemployment issue-field is characterised 
by a widespread sense of optimism, which is likely to encourage contacts vertically across the 
different levels. In sum, while the issue-field of asylum resembles a classical state-challenger 
dichotomy in which pro-beneficiary actors aim to develop their horizontal ties through both 
instrumental and expressive actions in order to strengthen their position against government 
and change the (perceived) hostile public attitude against the beneficiaries, the issue-field of 
unemployment stands out as a pacified multi-organisational field in which there is complete 
synchrony between state, civil society, and pro-beneficiary actors. 
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